County
of Riverside v. Keegan
TO BE DECIDED: "Does
the Mother's Failure to a File Financial Declaration Deny The
Court Jurisdiction to Award Child Support?"
This
is a child support case that arose out of a paternity action initialed
by
Mr.
Keegan. The court entered a child support order against Mr. Keegan,
retroactive to his date of filing the paternity complaint. At
that time, the county had not properly filed an Income and Expense
Declaration (I&E) as required by court rules.
Mr.
Keegan challenged the support order on the grounds that the mother
had not filed the required Declaration. He also objected to the
retroactive order.
The
appellate court found that, although the I & E was required,
nothing in the court's rules suggested that failure to supply
the I & E denied the court jurisdiction to award support.
In addition, the appellate court noted that Mr. Keegan was given
copies of an unfiled I & E. The appellate court also noted
he agreed with certain figures used to calculate the child support.
Further, Mr. Keegan himself produced the mother's pay stubs, a
tax return and other documents which supported the court's findings
for the child support order. The appellate court found the complaint
was sufficient notice of motion to seek child support and therefore,
the retroactive order was upheld.
Marriage
of Arrietta
TO BE DECIDED: "Does
a Prenuptial Agreement Regarding Spousal Support Contravene Public
Policy?"
A
California Appellate court has ruled that a waiver of spousal
support provision in a prenuptial agreement (PNA) does not contravene
public policy.
Prior
to their marriage, the parties each signed a PNA, written by the
W, that provided that all assets in her name at the time of the
marriage or acquired after marriage in her name, would be her
separate property. It also provided that in the event of divorce,
there would be no spousal support and the H would waive property
settlement.
W
later filed for divorce and the trial court ruled that the portion
of the PNA waiving spousal support was not enforceable because
it was against public policy.
California
has adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) which
permits parties to contract with respect to spousal support. The
California legislature however deleted the provision regarding
spousal support and has left it up to the courts to decide. The
appellate court decided that premarital contracts regarding spousal
support are not per se against public policy and upheld the validity
of the PNA.
Marriage
of Johnson
TO BE DECIDED: "Does
a Spouse Retain a Community Property Interest in Enhanced Portion
of Husband's Employee Retirement Benefit?"
This
case presents the issue of whether the additional portion of an
employee's pension attributable to an early retirement option
is community property as compensation for past services which
must be shared with a former spouse or is the employee's separate
property. The trial court awarded the ex-wife a community property
interest in the enhanced portion of the retirement benefits and
the appellate court affirmed.
In
this case, husband and wife divorced in 1972. In 1993, 21 years
after the divorce, and at the age of 53, H opted for early retirement.
His employer offered a voluntary retirement incentive (VRI) program
that resulted in higher monthly pension payments than it would
have paid under normal early retirement plan if H waited to retire
at age 55. Also, if H worked until normal retirement age of 65,
his monthly pension payments would have been higher than both
the early retirement plan and the VRI plan. H opted for the VRI.
Ex-W
then filed an order to obtain a one-half community property interest
in the enhanced portion of the VRI benefit, which amounted to
$748.85 per month more than the early retirement plan (what he
would have received at age 55). H argued that the enhanced benefit
was not part of the original employment contract with his employer
and he had no enforceable right to receive it during his marriage
to ex-W. He further argued that the company offered the VRI to
encourage early retirement to reduce its work force and therefore
was not deferred compensation for past services rendered but was
a severance package and therefore his separate property. The courts
however focused on what the enhancement represented, which was
deferred compensation for past services rendered, rather than
focus on when the enhancement was offered.
Montenegro v. Diaz
TO BE DECIDED: When Child Custody Previously Decided is Up for
Review, What Standard Must the Court Use to Modify Custody?
This case involved a couple who
were dating when their son was born. After a visitation dispute
between the parents, the father filed a complaint to establish
paternity and requested joint legal and physical custody. Sole
physical custody was granted to the mother. For the next few years,
the father sought custody "vigorously and repeatedly." Finally,
on his third attempt, when the child was five years old, the trial
court granted custody to the father. That court found that a change
in custody was in the child's best interest because the father
was willing to share his son, and to cooperate and communicate
regarding their son's care.
The appellate court reversed that
order, stating the trial court erred in applying the "best interest"
standard rather than the "changed circumstances" standard. Once
there has been an initial judicial determination of custody, custody
can only be changed "if changed circumstances make such an order
essential or expedient for the welfare of the child."
Here, mom was awarded custody initially,
however, this case also concerns whether a stipulated order for
custody is a "prior judicial determination" of the child's best
interests and thus requiring that later custody orders be based
on "changed circumstances" rather than on the best interest of
the child standard.